Ben Stein pointed the other day to the fact that Goldman had been shorting mortgage securities at the same time that it was underwriting them (and selling them to institutional investors). I pointed out that there is a clear conflict of interest in this and that it would create waves.
The NYT came out today with an article on how bad the situation for the securitizations from the street in 2006 are currently and points to the fact that many of them were actually hedging agaist a downfall (or being short) at the same time that they were underwriting them.
One big bank that saw the trouble coming, Goldman Sachs, began reducing its inventory of mortgages and mortgage securities late last year. Even so, Goldman went on to package and sell more than $6 billion of new securities backed by subprime mortgages during the first nine months of this year.
Of the loans backing the Goldman deals for which data is available, nearly 15 percent are already delinquent by more than 60 days, are in foreclosure or have resulted in the repossession of a home, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The average default rate for subprime loans packaged in 2007 is 11 percent.
In any case, the bankers argue, buyers of such securities — institutional investors like pension funds, banks and hedge funds — are sophisticated and understand the risks.
Wall Street officials maintain that the system worked as it was supposed to. Underwriters, they say, did not pressure colleagues on trading desks or in research departments to promote securities blindly.
Goldman Sachs also moved early to insulate itself from potential losses. Almost a year ago, on Dec. 14, 2006, David A. Viniar, Goldman’s chief financial officer, called a “mortgage risk” meeting. The investment bank’s mortgage desk was losing money, and Mr. Viniar, with various officials, reviewed every position in the bank’s portfolio.
The bank decided to reduce its stockpile of mortgages and mortgage-related securities and to buy expensive insurance as protection against further losses, said a person briefed on the meeting who was not authorized to speak about the situation publicly.
Goldman, however, did not stop selling subprime mortgage securities. The bank, like other firms, retains a piece of the securities it sells. A Goldman spokesman said the firm was not betting against the mortgage securities it underwrote in 2007.
Like Goldman, Lehman Brothers also started to hedge its huge inventory of home loans in the second quarter of this year, concerned about poor underwriting standards. But Lehman also continued to sell mortgage securities packed with shaky loans, underwriting $16.5 billion of new securities in the first nine months of 2007. About 15 percent of the loans backing these securities have defaulted.
As has been pointed out in the past - there was a clear link between Wall Street and sub-prime originators. Wall Street found (smart and/or dumb) liquidity for exotic instruments that were backed by mortgages and the originators had no problems finding ever higher yielding mortgages.
I am guessing this will have interesting tails...
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